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I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War, which paralyzed the United Nations
from its inception, was a cause for celebration and hope.  Following
the historic Security Council Summit Meeting of January 1992, the
then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction “among nations large and small,
that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives
of the U.N. Charter (Charter)—a United Nations capable of main-
taining international peace and security, of securing justice and hu-
man rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, ‘social pro-
gress and better standards of life in larger freedom.’”1  He warned,
however, that this opportunity “must not be squandered,” and that
the United Nations “must never again be crippled as it was in the era
that has now passed.”2
In the months that followed, the international community was to
experience shocking aberrations, reminiscent of a dark and seemingly
remote past.  Reports of “ethnic cleansing” and “death camps” sur-
faced from Bosnia-Herzegovina, only to be followed by the singular
cataclysm of Rwanda in which nearly one million people perished in
*
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1. Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (1992).
2. Id.
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just three months.3  These events led one commentator to observe
that “genocide has become a growth industry.”4
Calamity acted as catalyst, however, and the post-Cold War po-
litical context allowed for the unprecedented establishment by the
Security Council of two ad hoc international criminal jurisdictions to
punish serious violations of humanitarian law.  On May 25, 1993,
having determined that “widespread and flagrant violations of inter-
national humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia . . . constitute a threat to international peace and se-
curity,”5 and that “in the particular circumstances of the former
Yugoslavia the establishment [of] an ad hoc . . . international tribu-
nal . . . would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace”6 within the ambit of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 827 pursuant to which it established the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (Yugoslav Tri-
bunal).7  Similarly, on November 8, 1994, having determined that the
“genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law . . . committed in Rwanda . . . consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security,”8 the Security Coun-
cil adopted Resolution 955 whereby it established the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide
and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda (Rwanda Tribunal).9
3. See Report of the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. R. Degni-
Sequi, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR Commission on
Human Rights, 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, para. 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994)
(“[T]he number of persons killed throughout the territory is to be numbered in the hundreds of
thousands, estimates ranging from 200,000 to 500,000.  In fact, even the latter figure is probably
less than the reality.  Some observers think that the figure is close to a million.  It is not sure
that the exact number of victims will ever be known.”).
4. David J. Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1996, at
34.
5. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., paras. 3-4, U.N. Doc S/RES/827
(1993).
6. Id. para. 6.
7. Id.  For an overview of the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal, see James C.
O’Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 639 (1993).
8. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994).
9. Id.  For an overview of the establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal, see Payam Akha-
van, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punish-
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It is instructive to note that it was not the massive and systematic
scale of the human rights violations as such which triggered Security
Council action, but rather, the determination that such violations, in
the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
constituted a “threat to international peace and security”10 as re-
quired by Chapter VII of the Charter.11  In other words, it is conceiv-
able that even unconscionable atrocities may fall short of the juridical
threshold required for collective enforcement action by the United
Nations.  However invidious this instrumentalization of  human rights
may be from a moral perspective, the political significance for world
order of the linkage between international criminal justice and the
maintenance of peace should not be disparaged.  In effect, the estab-
lishment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals is an unprecedented
institutional expression of the indivisibility of peace and respect for
human rights.  It represents a radical departure from the traditional
realpolitik paradigm which has so often and for so long ignored the
victims of mass murder and legitimized the rule of tyrants in the
name of promoting the purported summum bonum of stability.12
Despite the significance of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals,
the path ahead is fraught with obstacles and difficulties.  A paradigm
shift at the level of policy making does not instantaneously transform
everyday reality, especially in a society which has experienced geno-
cide.  The question is, therefore, whether and to what extent an ad
hoc international criminal jurisdiction can contribute to the recon-
ciliation process in the wake of mass violence.
The choice of focus of this article on the Rwanda Tribunal and
its potential impact on peace in the Great Lakes region of Africa13
was not an arbitrary one.  While it is recognized that any attempt at
“comparative calamity” with a view to measuring human suffering is
ultimately a futile and obscene exercise, the tragedy which befell
Rwanda in 1994 deserves a special place in the blood-stained pages of
history.14  The Rwandan genocide merits distinction not only because
                                                                                                                                     
ment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501 (1996).
10. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 5, at 1; S.C. Res. 955 supra note 8, at 1.
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
12. For example, the international community tolerated the participation of the murder-
ous Khmer Rouge in a coalition government representing Cambodia at the United Nations un-
til 1993, despite the group’s heinous crimes against its own civilian population.  See, e.g., Payam
Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention: A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 229, 247-48 (1995).
13. The Great Lakes region of Africa consists of the countries bordering Lake Victoria,
Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika, including Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.
14. The U.N. Special Rapporteur observed in 1994: “The Rwandese have indeed been the
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of its shocking efficiency, its scale and its proportional dimensions
among the victim population,15 but also because the international
community could have prevented at least its most revolting aspects
but refused to intervene.16  It is also befitting to focus on the Rwanda
Tribunal because its significance has been overshadowed by the pro-
ceedings of the Yugoslav Tribunal.  It is telling that the fugitive
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has become a media celebrity
whereas the March 1996 arrest of Colonel Bagosora, a leading mem-
ber of the former Interim Government in Rwanda during the mass
killings of 1994, has hardly been noticed.  One is tempted to ask a
question with far-reaching consequences on the future of interna-
tional justice: Was it simply Western cultural proximity with the
Yugoslav victims which provoked the cries of indignation that re-
sulted in the establishment of an International Tribunal?  Had the
Rwandan genocide occurred first, would we have resigned ourselves
to the view of Africa as a continent where horror is commonplace,
and where an International Tribunal would make no appreciable dif-
ference?
II. SPECTATORS OF THE ARCHETYPAL AFRICAN
GENOCIDE: PREVENTION BEFORE PUNISHMENT
When speaking of justice in the wake of cataclysm, it is often as-
sumed that mass violence is an inevitable human phenomenon.  On
the contrary, systematic mass violence and large scale atrocities nec-
essarily require organization, planning and preparation, often accom-
plished under the authority of government.  A consequence of this
simple fact is that such cataclysms can be foreseen, and thus pre-
vented by an observant international community.
Organization and planning was certainly at work in Rwanda,
where an estimated one million people from a total population of 7.5
million were slaughtered in less than three months.17  As the Rwan-
dan representative to the Security Council stated, “On the same
                                                                                                                                     
victims of a number of massacres in the past, notably in 1959, 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992
and 1993.  However, those being perpetrated at present are unprecedented in the history of the
country and even in that of the entire African continent.  They have taken on an extent une-
qualed in space and in time.”  U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7, supra note 3, para. 20.
15. See supra note 3.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Such Violations Committed in the
Territory of Neighboring States,  U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.3453 (1994).
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scale, in a country the size of the United States this would be equiva-
lent to the loss of over 37 million Americans in under three
months.”18  In its own gruesome way, such efficiency is an impressive
feat of organization, especially in a developing country.  Accordingly,
the Rwandan genocide cannot simply be dismissed as an unforesee-
able and spontaneous outburst of primordial bloodlust.  This simplis-
tic “tribal war thesis” is often a reflection of ethnocentrism, if not an
expedient absolution from apathy in the face of immense human suf-
fering.
Such apathy and ethnocentrism are reflected by the fact that the
international community was aware of the widespread violence in
Rwanda well before April 1994, but refused to take sufficient meas-
ures to end the suffering. As early as March 1993, an International
Commission of Inquiry, comprised of representatives from four re-
spected human rights non-governmental organizations, issued a re-
port suggesting that the then horrific human rights abuses against the
Tutsi in Rwanda may qualify as genocide.19  Similarly, after his mis-
sion to Rwanda in April 1993, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on ex-
trajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye,
submitted a report to the Human Rights Commission in which he
concluded that there existed widespread and systematic abuses, in-
cluding incitement to ethnic hatred and violence against the Tutsi.20
Accordingly, the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana on
April 6, 1994, was simply “the spark to the powder keg which set off
the massacre of civilians” and not the root cause of the genocide as
some seem to suggest.21  As the Rwandan representative to the Secu-
rity Council pointed out:
[T]he genocide the world witnessed in April 1994 was the result of a
long period of planning during which pilot projects for extermina-
tion were successfully tested . . . . The international community,
through its diplomatic representatives and international organiza-
18. Id.
19. Rapport de la commission internationale d’enquête sur les violations des droits de
l’homme au Rwanda depuis le 1er octobre 1990 (7-21 janvier 1993), Rapport Final, March 1993,
at p. 96.  The four human rights NGOs were, respectively: Fédération Internationale des Droits
de l’Homme (Paris), Africa Watch (New York), Union Interafricaine des Droits de l´Homme
et des Peuples (Ouagadougou), and Centre International des Droits de la Personne et du
Développement Démocratique (Montréal).
20. See Report by Mr. B.W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his Mission to Rwanda from 8
to 17 April 1993, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item
12, paras. 19-20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1 (1993).
21. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7, supra note 3, para. 19.
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tions in Kigali as well as many reports by human rights organiza-
tions, was well aware of these massacres and cannot claim that it
became cognizant of the situation only in the wake of the tragedy
of April 1994.22
Furthermore, the actions of the international community after
the outbreak of mass violence in April 1994 betrayed a lack of inter-
est in intervening against this cataclysm.  In October 1993, the Secu-
rity Council had established the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Rwanda (UNAMIR), a 2,500 member observer force, to monitor
implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,23 concluded in
August 1993 between the Government of Rwanda and the insurgent
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).24  On April 20, 1994, several days
after the airplane crash resulting in the death in Kigali of the Presi-
dents of Rwanda and Burundi, Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien
Ntyamira, the  U.N. Secretary-General issued a Special Report in
which reference is made to the “torrent of widespread killings” which
appears to have “both political and ethnic dimensions,” indicating
that the deaths “could possibly number tens of thousands.”25  Earlier,
the Government of Belgium had decided to withdraw its battalion
from Rwanda following the murder by Rwandan government forces
of ten members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.26
In view of the critical situation, the Secretary-General offered
three alternatives for the consideration of the Security Council.  The
first and preferred alternative of the Secretary-General was the
“immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in
its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorized to coerce
the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law
and order and put an end to the killings.”27  The second alternative
was the retention in Kigali of a small group, headed by the Force
Commander, with necessary staff “to act as intermediary between the
two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a cease-
22. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994), supra note 17, at 14-15.
23. See S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993).
24. The Arusha Peace agreement was concluded under the auspices of the United Nations
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
25. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/1994/470 (1994).
26. See Donatella Lorch, Anarchy Rules Rwanda’s Capital and Drunken Soldiers Roam
City, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1995, at A3.
27. U.N. Doc. S/1994/470 (1994), supra note 25, para. 13.
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fire.”28  The third alternative, which the Secretary-General did not fa-
vor, was the “complete withdrawal of UNAMIR.”29
On April 21, the Security Council opted for the second alterna-
tive and adopted Resolution 912 whereby the force level of
UNAMIR was reduced to a small group of 270 soldiers.30  As the hor-
rors of the genocide were unfolding, in the euphemistic terminology
typical of such predicaments, the Security Council resolution simply
demanded an end to the “mindless violence and carnage which [were]
engulfing Rwanda” without proposing any corresponding enforce-
ment measures.31  Thus, an unpleasant reality was “sanitized” through
the antiseptic rhetoric of international diplomacy, and the pleas of
the Secretary-General that “downsizing was not the answer” fell on
deaf ears.32  The policy of evasion was so amazingly entrenched that
some members of the Security Council went so far as to instruct their
representatives “not to describe the deaths there as genocide, even
though some senior officials believe that is exactly what they repre-
sent.”33  A month later, on May 25, evidently exasperated by the
enormity of what had transpired and reluctance of the Security
Council to take more forceful action, the Secretary-General admitted
international culpability with exceptional candor and equanimity.
“We are all responsible for this disaster, not only the super-powers,
but also the African countries, the non-governmental organizations,
the entire international community.  There has been a genocide, and
the world is talking about what it should do.  It is a scandal.”34
Indeed, it is ironic that one of the first indictments before the
Tribunal, the case of Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,35 appears to be as
much an indictment of the international community as it is of the ac-
cused.  The statement of fact clearly suggests that the defendant was
28. Id. para. 15.
29. Id. para. 19.
30. See S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3368th mtg., para. 8, UN Doc. SC/RES/912
(1994).
31. Id. para. 6.
32. Letter Dated 29 April 1994 of Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Secu-
rity Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/518 (1994).
33. Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings Genocide, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 1994 at A8.
34. Un “Scandal” dont “Tout le Monde est Responsable”, LE MONDE, May 27, 1994 at 6.
35. Indictment, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, U.N. Doc. ICTR-96-3-I (International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda 1996).  Georges Rutaganda was charged with genocide, crimes against
humanity and violations of article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions for his part in the
brutal killing of civilian Tutsis in Kigali and Gitarama throughout April of 1994.  See Id. at 1-5.
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able to massacre innocent civilians only after the withdrawal of
UNAMIR:
Following the death of President Habyarimana, as violence esca-
lated in Kigali, thousands of unarmed Tutsi men, women and chil-
dren and some unarmed Hutus sought refuge at the ETO school . . .
[which] . . . was considered a safe haven because Belgian soldiers,
part of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda forces,
were stationed there.  On April 11, 1994, immediately after the
Belgians withdrew, members of Rwandese Armed Forces, gen-
darmerie and militia, including the Interahamwe, attacked the
school and killed people with machetes, grenades and guns.36
The genocide of 1994 was anything but a surprise for the interna-
tional community.  It was the culmination of many years of cynical
indifference and willful blindness to the plight of the Rwandan peo-
ple.  In the words of the Rwandan representative to the Security
Council:
Since 1959 Rwanda has repeatedly experienced collective massa-
cres, which, as early as 1964, were described by Pope Paul VI and
two Nobel Prize winners—Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre—
as the most atrocious acts of genocide this century after that of the
Jews during the Second World War.  But whenever such tragedies
occurred the world kept silent and acted as though it did not under-
stand that there was a grave problem of the violation of human
rights.37
Thus, in 1994 the international community became a spectator to
what may aptly be called “the archetypal African genocide,” the at-
tempted extermination of an entire people.
It is apparent that ex post facto punishment of genocide is no
substitute for effective preventive action.  The establishment of the
Rwanda Tribunal cannot undo the damage that resulted from the
failure to intervene.  Nor can it now bring instantaneous relief
through justice and reconciliation to a society traumatized beyond
imagination.  If the Tribunal has brought instantaneous relief, it has
been for the benefit of the spectators whose conscience has been
eased, and whose credentials as “civilized nations” have been reaf-
firmed.  In the wake of such a monstrous cataclysm, the achievements
36. Id. at 3-4.
37. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994), supra note 17, at 13-14.
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of the Tribunal in the short-term can be described as modest, at best.
III. CONFRONTING THE ENTREPRENEURS OF HATE:
ERADICATING A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
The potential contribution of the Tribunal to national reconcilia-
tion in Rwanda depends on understanding the root causes of the 1994
genocide.  It is obvious that an essential ingredient of this tragedy
was historical rivalry and ethnic fear between Hutu and Tutsi.38  But
this ingredient, though necessary, was not sufficient.  It was necessary
to transform these tensions into systematic mass violence, a feat
which could only be achieved through careful planning and execution
under the direction of political elites.
In 1994, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human
rights situation in Rwanda identified three causes of the genocide
which were “immediately apparent.”39  The first was the “rejection of
alternate political power” typical of the region, but which “takes on a
special form in Rwanda, where it has strong ethnic overtones.”40  The
Special Rapporteur observed that the mass killings of Tutsi “is not
ethnic as such, but rather political, the aim being the seizure of politi-
cal power, or rather the retention of power, by the representatives of
one ethnic group, previously the underdogs, who are using every
means, principally the elimination of the opposing ethnic group, but
also the elimination of political opponents within their own group.”41
The second identified cause of the genocide was the “incitement
to ethnic hatred and violence.”42  In this respect, the most significant
instrument was Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM),
the propaganda organ of the Hutu extremists: “RTLM does not hesi-
tate to call for the extermination of the Tutsi and it is notorious for
the decisive role that it appears to have played in the massacres.  It is
known as the ‘killer radio station’, and justifiably so.”43  According to
Reporters sans frontières, RTLM proclaimed that by May 1994, “the
cleansing of the Tutsi must be completed” and that “the grave is still
only half full, who will help us to fill it?”44  This systematic campaign
38. For an excellent overview of the historical roots of the rivalry between Hutu and Tutsi,
see GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 9-40 (1995).
39. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7, supra note 3, para. 55.
40. Id. para. 56.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 14.
43. Id. para. 59.
44. Id.
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of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence was “made more danger-
ous by the fact that the generally illiterate Rwandese rural population
listens very attentively to broadcasts in Kinyarwanda; they hold their
radio sets in one hand and their machetes in the other, ready to go
into action.”45
The third cause was “impunity” which, like incitement, was “a
recurrent cause of the massacres.”46  Impunity is the cumulative effect
of the rejection of alternate political power and the incitement to
ethnic hatred and violence.  Because, at the time of the genocide in
1994, “[n]o legal steps [had] been taken against those responsible for
the earlier and present massacres, although they [were] known to the
public and the authorities,”47 there was no fear of punishment.
The 1994 Rwandan genocide was not unique.  In fact, it was typi-
cal of past genocidal violence.  A leading historical survey observed:
[I]n order to perform a genocide the perpetrator has always had to
first organize a campaign that redefined the victim group as worth-
less, outside the web of mutual obligations, a threat to the people,
immoral sinners, and/or subhuman.  Even after such a campaign of
vilification and dehumanization the actual performance of the mass
killing seems to have required a good deal of coercion and central-
ized control . . . . it seems that mass killing is extremely difficult for
ordinary people to carry out; it requires the recruitment of patho-
logical individuals and criminals.48
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt points out that the
murderers of the notorious Einsatzgruppen49 “were not sadists or kill-
ers by nature . . . . Hence the problem was how to overcome not so
much their conscience as the animal pity by which all normal men are
affected in the presence of physical suffering.”50  She observes:
[J]ust as the law in civilized countries assumes that the voice of con-
science tells everybody ‘Thou shalt not kill’, even though man’s
natural desires and inclinations may at times be murderous, so the
45. Id.
46. Id. para. 60.
47. Id. para. 61.
48. FRANK CHALK & KURT JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE
28 (1990).
49. The Einsatzgruppen were special Nazi forces responsible for the extermination of en-
emy civilians in occupied territories during World War II.
50. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 105-06 (2d ed. 1992).
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law of Hitler’s land demanded that the voice of conscience tell eve-
rybody: ‘Thou shalt kill,’ although the organizers of the massacres
knew full well that murder is against the normal desires and inclina-
tions of most people.51
Even those who posit deeply rooted anti-Semitism as the cause
of the Holocaust do not deny the essential role of political elites in
transforming that hatred into systematic genocide.  In the words of
Daniel Goldhagen in Hitler’s Willing Executioners:
The road to Auschwitz was not twisted.  Conceived by Hitler’s
apocalyptically bent mind as an urgent, though future, project, its
completion had to wait until conditions were right.  The instant that
they were, Hitler commissioned his architects, Himmler and Hey-
drich, to work from his vague blueprint in designing and engineer-
ing the road.  They, in turn, easily enlisted ordinary Germans by the
tens of thousands, who built and paved it with an immense dedica-
tion born of great hatred for the Jews whom they drove down that
road.52
As different as the contexts may seem, there are certain similari-
ties between the “Final Solution” under Nazi Germany and its 1994
Rwandan variant.  A leading commentator explained how centralized
state control through a comprehensive administrative apparatus, to-
gether with a culture of faithful obedience to authority, was indispen-
sable for the Rwandan genocide:
The efficiency of the massacres bore witness to the quality of
Rwandese local administration and also to its responsibility.  If the
local administration had not carried out orders from the capital so
blindly, many lives would have been saved . . . . [T]here had always
been a strong tradition of unquestioning obedience to authority in
the pre-colonial kingdom of Rwanda.  This tradition was of course
reinforced by both the German and the Belgian colonial admini-
strations.  And since independence the country has lived under a
well-organized tightly-controlled state.  When the highest authori-
ties in that state told you to do something you did it, even if it in-
cluded killing.  There is some similarity here to the Prussian tradi-
tion of the German state and its ultimate perversion into the
disciplined obedience to Nazi orders.53
51. Id. at 150.
52. DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 425 (1996).
53. PRUNIER, supra note 38, at 244-45 (1995).
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Returning to the three apparent causes of the Rwandan geno-
cide, the inter-linked pattern of justice and reconciliation emerges.
First, at the political level, those who have used genocide as a means
of rejecting alternate political power must be openly stigmatized and
permanently removed from public office or any other position of
authority.  The Rwanda Tribunal provides an impartial and authori-
tative judicial forum before which the culpability of such persons may
be established.  Only the most cynical and short-sighted would accept
the proposition that those who thrive on hatred and mass violence
can be relied upon to build a peaceful society.  There is a distinction
between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda insofar as the former has
to contend with the reality that the genocidal killers are still in posi-
tions of authority whereas the latter has the advantage of their mili-
tary defeat and exile.54  Even so, the Hutu extremists in the refugee
camps of neighboring countries continue to be a major source of con-
flict, throughout the Great Lakes region.55
In this respect, the indictment and prosecution of Hutu extremist
leaders by the Rwanda Tribunal has the potential to play a vital role
in contributing to lasting reconciliation by facilitating the repatriation
of refugees.  The continued displacement of some 1.1 million Rwan-
dans who sought refuge in Zaire after the RPF victory in July 1994 is
a major source of instability in the Great Lakes region.56  Indeed, it
must be remembered that the armed conflict from 1990 to 1994 be-
tween the Habyarimana regime and the RPF itself was the culmina-
tion of a festering refugee problem which began with the political
violence of the decolonization period between 1959 and 1963, and the
consequent mass exodus of Tutsis to neighboring countries such as
Uganda and Burundi.57  Similarly, the continued displacement of
Hutu refugees would most probably lead to a renewal of armed con-
flict accompanied by the massacre of civilians.58
54. For a discussion of justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, see Payam Ak-
havan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond, 18
HUM. RTS. Q. 259 (1996).
55. See James McKinley Jr., Strife on the Zaire Border Erupts Into Open War with
Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at A1.
56. See id.  See also infra, note 58.
57. See PRUNIER, supra note 38, at 41-92.
58. Editor’s Note:  Since the writing of this article in July 1996, events in the Great Lakes
region have amply demonstrated the author’s prognosis regarding destabilizing effects of the
Hutu refugee population.  The refugee camps in neighboring Zaire were used by the remnants
of the Hutu extremist leadership to launch military operations into Rwanda as well as neigh-
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In this respect, the remnants of the Hutu extremist leadership
appear to be the primary impediment to the repatriation efforts of
the United Nations.  A 1994 report of the Secretary-General on secu-
rity in the Rwandan refugee camps observed that:
There are approximately 230 Rwandese political leaders in Zaire,
including former ministers, senior civilian and military officials,
members of parliament and other political personalities, many of
whom live in good conditions in hotels and houses outside the refu-
gee camps . . . . These leaders exert a hold on the refugees through
intimidation and the support of military personnel and militia
members in the camps . . . .  They are determined to ensure by
force, if necessary, that the refugees do not repatriate to Rwanda.
They also make it difficult for relief agencies to carry out their work
in safety, because they attempt to control the agencies’ activities in
the camps and prevent relief supplies from reaching those in need.
It is believed that these elements may be preparing for an armed
invasion of Rwanda and that they may be stockpiling and selling
food distributed by relief agencies in preparation for such an inva-
sion.  There have already been some cross border incursions.59
This strategy is characteristic of deposed leaders for whom the hap-
less refugee population is at once a political constituency, a source of
income, and a territorial base for launching military offensives.  It is
reminiscent of the activities of the Khmer Rouge leadership in exile
after their overthrow by the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambo-
dia.60
While there should be no compromise whatsoever with those
Hutu leaders in exile who were responsible for the 1994 genocide, no
                                                                                                                                     
boring Burundi, both of which had Tutsi dominated regimes.  These hostilities also created ten-
sions between the Hutu and Tutsi populations indigenous to the region of Zaire around Lake
Kivu.  Military counter-offensives by Rwandan forces and escalating tensions within Zaire
eventually led to a major rebel movement under the leadership of Laurent Kabila which, as of
the time this article went to press, had captured virtually all of Zaire and threatened immi-
nently to overthrow President Mobuto Sese Seko.  Hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees
were forcibly and voluntarily repatriated to Rwanda while numerous others fell to starvation,
disease and revenge massacres.  See, e.g., Great Lakes of Blood: Africa’s Hutu-Tutsi Wars May
Go On and On, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 1996, at 16; Waiting for the Rebels, THE ECONOMIST,
Mar. 8, 1997, at 43; Liberating Zaire Is the Easy Bit, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 1997, at 35; Za-
ire: Time for Revenge, THE ECONOMIST,  Apr. 26, 1997, at 42.
59. Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., paras. 7-8, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1308 (1994).
60. A leading historian explained that by 1982 the Khmer Rouge “had become an effec-
tive, well-equipped military force” and that their “dependents, who were treated as political
refugees, were fed and housed by United Nations agencies.”  DAVID P. CHANDLER, A
HISTORY OF CAMBODIA 231 (1993).
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effort should be spared to encourage the participation of Hutu mod-
erates in the Government of Rwanda, many of whom themselves
were victims of the mass killings.61  Hutu extremism cannot be re-
placed by Tutsi extremism, because it will guarantee yet another
repetition of the mass violence which has plagued Rwanda for dec-
ades.  Accordingly, the prosecution of Hutu extremist leaders before
the Rwanda Tribunal should not degenerate into a political weapon
by which the power sharing arrangements envisaged under the 1993
Arusha Peace Agreement are undermined.  On the contrary, the Tri-
bunal should become an instrument by which those responsible for
the genocide are distinguished from moderate Hutu leaders who have
a legitimate right to participate in the government of their country.
While the prosecution of former leaders is an essential ingredi-
ent for reconciliation at the political level, there has to be a corre-
sponding transformation of values among the Rwandan people who
have been subjected to decades of incitement to ethnic hatred and
violence, whether as victim or as obedient perpetrator.  The Tutsi
must absolve the Hutu of indefinite collective responsibility for the
genocide while also having a legitimate means of vindicating their
suffering through a “collective catharsis.”  The Rwanda Tribunal, in
concert with appropriate national trials, can play a decisive role in
this respect.  As Richard Goldstone explained with respect to the In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg:
[The trials of war criminals] ensured that guilt was personalised—
when one looks at the emotive photographs of the accused in the
dock at Nuremberg one sees a group of criminals.  One does not
see a group representative of the German people—the people who
produced Goethe or Heine or Beethoven.  The Nuremberg Trials
were a meaningful instrument for avoiding the guilt of the Nazis
being ascribed to the whole German people.  Then, too, the Nur-
emberg Trials played an important role in enabling the victims of
the Holocaust to obtain official acknowledgment of what befell
them.62
The victims must see that justice will be done so that collective
vengeance against Hutu can be discouraged, whether in the form of
reprisal killings, or the arbitrary detention of tens of thousands of
61. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7, supra note 3, para. 49.
62. Richard J. Goldstone, 50 Years after Nuremberg: A New International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: CAUSES, CASES, CON-
SEQUENCES 215, 215-216 (Albert J. Jongman ed., 1996).
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“suspected” génocidaires in inhumane conditions.63  In this respect,
every effort must be made to expedite the prosecution of such ac-
cused with a view to the immediate release of all persons who are not
culpable.  With its very limited resources, the International Tribunal
cannot even attempt to replace the role of Rwandan national courts
in delivering fair trials to the approximately 85,000 persons presently
detained.64  The Prosecutor of the Tribunal has already indicated that
the “essential objective” of his office is “to bring to justice those most
responsible both at the national and local level for the mass killings
that took place in Rwanda in 1994,” referring in particular to persons
in positions of leadership and authority.65  The symbolic effect of
prosecuting even a limited number of such leaders before an interna-
tional jurisdiction would have considerable impact on national recon-
ciliation as well as deterrence of such crimes in the future.  Never-
theless, it is only the Rwandan courts that can attempt to deliver
justice to the tens of thousands languishing in overcrowded prisons.
Although the Tribunal enjoys primacy over national courts, Ar-
ticle 8 of its Statute provides for the concurrent jurisdiction with na-
tional courts.66  The Rwandan judiciary, however, was decimated in
1994, and only forty magistrates remained after the genocide.67  Fur-
thermore, the amount of resources required for prosecuting tens of
thousands of suspects within a reasonable time period would be con-
siderable even in a wealthy state.  In this respect, the November 1995
Kigali Conference on Genocide and Impunity recommended the es-
tablishment of a specialized judicial mechanism for expediting the
prosecution of genocide, a proposal which the Rwandan government
63. The U.N. Special Rapporteur refered to the burgeoning prison population as a major
source of human rights violations in Rwanda: “The prison population was estimated respec-
tively at 29,400 persons in the 13 official detention centres as of 29 May 1995, and at 46,000 in
all prisons as of 10 June.  Those figures have increased substantially, having risen, as at 6 De-
cember 1995, to 44,712 and about 61,210, respectively.  They will certainly have to be revised
upwards because of the increase in persons incarcerated in isolation cells.”  Report of the Situa-
tion of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. Rene Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994,  U.N.
ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 10, para. 89, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/68 (1996).
64. Allan Thompson, Rebuilding a Whole Structure of Justice: In Rwanda, Revenge or Rec-
onciliation?, WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Feb. 1997, at 9.
65. See December 12, 1995, Press Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda, Justice Richard Goldstone.
66. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex 1, art. 8, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994).
67. See UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, RWANDA: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR
CRIMES AND GENOCIDE, 15 (1994).
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has accepted.68  Furthermore, there have been various international
efforts aimed at the training of judicial personnel and the develop-
ment of judicial institutions.69  Nonetheless, the Rwandan judicial sys-
tem is still far from responding to the expectations of the administra-
tors of justice and victims alike, and the obstacles to its rehabilitation
persist.70
The concurrent and expeditious prosecution of suspects before
the International Tribunal and national courts is an important confi-
dence-building measure which will greatly contribute to future peace
in Rwanda.  It is an essential means of preventing vengeful actions
and thereby safeguarding the right to life, liberty and security of the
person.  Notwithstanding the obstructive role of Hutu extremists in
refugee camps, such prosecutions are also an essential prerequisite
for the repatriation efforts of the United Nations and, consequently,
for the long-term stability of the entire Great Lakes region.  As the
report of the Secretary-General on the refugee situation noted, the
Hutu extremists in exile are not the sole impediment to repatriation:
The refugees’ fear of reprisals by the Government for atrocities
committed against Tutsis and moderate Hutus seems to be another
main reason for their hesitancy about returning to Rwanda.  While
this fear has been exacerbated by efforts on the part of political
leaders, Rwandese government forces elements and militia to dis-
suade the refugees from returning home, it also appears to be
rooted in the history of the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis
in Rwanda.71
For their part, the Hutu must be disabused of their racist notions
about the Tutsi which have been instilled into their minds by ex-
tremist leaders through indoctrination and misinformation.72  Most
importantly, they must become aware of the whole truth of what
transpired in 1994 so that they will not fall victim to the deception
68. Office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Recommendations of the Confer-
ence Held in Kigali from November 1st to 5th, 1995 on Genocide, Impunity and Accountability:
Dialogue for a National and International Response (December, 1995).
69. See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Field Operation in Rwanda, The Admini-
stration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, U.N. Doc. HRFOR/JUSTICE/June 1996/E
(1996).
70. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/68, supra note 63, para. 45.
71. Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1308 (1994).
72. The Hutu commonly refer to the Tutsi as the inyenzi, or cockroach, which must be
crushed.
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and historical revisionism of Hutu extremists.  A case in point is the
open letter entitled “The Rwandese People Accuse,” submitted on
September 21, 1994, to the President of the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights in Geneva by Agnès Ntamabyaliro, the Minis-
ter of Justice of the so-called Rwandan “government in exile” based
in Bukavu, Zaire.  This open letter, copies of which were sent to the
Secretary-General as well as several heads of state, speaks of the
“massacres of the Rwandese people” by the RPF and suggests that
those who believe that hundreds of thousands were slaughtered by
Hutu extremists have simply “allowed themselves to be manipulated
and abused by the propaganda of the RPF and its African and Euro-
pean supporters.”73  In short, the genocide of 1994 is reduced to a de-
ception of international opinion “created to serve imperialist inter-
ests.”74  A fundamental condition for reconciliation is widespread
recognition of the truth that what transpired in 1994 was a genocide
in which the Rwandan population was decimated and that there was
nothing inherent or inevitable about the whirlwind of hatred and
violence which swept through the country; and a recognition that
Hutu and Tutsi walked the road to hell, victim and perpetrator alike,
at the instigation of extremist leaders whose interests it served, and
that the people of Rwanda are not doomed to repeat the mistakes of
the past.  Thus, through the International Tribunal, as well as na-
tional trials, the Rwandan people may be witness to the truth and
thereby exorcise themselves from the spectres of the past.
In summary, it is apt to quote the words of the Rwandan repre-
sentative before the Security Council who pointed out that “it is im-
possible to build a state of law and arrive at true national reconcilia-
tion” without eradicating “the culture of impunity” which has
characterized Rwandan society for so long.75  Those “who were
taught that it was acceptable to kill as long as the victim was from a
different ethnic group or from an opposition party, cannot arrive at
national reconciliation unless they learn new values” which can only
be achieved “if equitable justice is established and if the survivors are
assured that what has happened will never happen again.”76  Through
punishment of “those responsible for the Rwandese tragedy,” the
73. Letter from Agnès Ntamabyaliro to the President of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights  (Sept. 27, 1994) (on file with author; available from the Ministry of Informa-
tion, Bukavu, Zaire).
74. Id.
75. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (1994), supra  note 17, at 14.
76. Id.
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Tribunal “will help national reconciliation and the construction of a
new society based on social justice and respect for the fundamental
rights of the human person.”77
The inter-linkage between justice and reconciliation notwith-
standing, there are two caveats of which all concerned must be aware.
First, in a country with an impoverished, largely rural and illiterate
population, justice rendered by the International Tribunal in Arusha
can have no reality or appreciable effect without a systematic effort
aimed at the widespread dissemination of knowledge about the trials.
To accomplish this end, the most accessible language, Kinyarwanda,
and the most accessible medium, the radio, should be used.  Because
at present the only possibility for such broadcasts is through the
state-controlled Radio Rwanda, it is imperative that all elements of
the Rwandan government cooperate in this campaign of public in-
formation and education.  Those whose interests reconciliation does
not serve, for whom the grief and hatred of the victims is a political
opportunity, bear a heavy responsibility if they deny the Rwandan
people the right to see justice done.
The second caveat concerns the delicate balance which must be
struck between the integrity of the judicial process on the one hand,
and the appeasement of victims’ grievances on the other.  While the
Rwandan people must be full participants in the reconstruction of
their society, there should be no illusions about the limited extent to
which a fair and impartial judicial process can accommodate popular
sentiments.  Arendt warned against the temptations of turning a trial
into a show trial: “Justice does not permit anything of the sort; it de-
mands seclusion, it permits sorrow rather than anger, and it pre-
scribes the most careful abstention from all nice pleasures of putting
oneself in the limelight.”78  In her critique of the Eichmann trial she
claimed that the case of the prosecution “was built on what the Jews
suffered” and “not on what Eichmann had done.”79  Although every
effort must be made to vindicate the suffering of the victim, it must
not be forgotten that “[a] trial resembles a play in that both begin
and end with the doer, not with the victim . . . . In the center of a trial
can only be the one who did—in this respect, he is like the hero in the
play—and if he suffers, he must suffer for what he has done, not for
77. Id.
78. ARENDT, supra note 50, at 6.
79. Id.
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what he has caused others to suffer.”80  Accordingly, the Rwanda Tri-
bunal, or trials before national courts for that matter, cannot act as a
substitute for a truth commission or, worse, degenerate into a public
spectacle.
IV. THE RWANDAN PAST, THE BURUNDIAN FUTURE: THE
CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION
If Rwanda is a genocide past, Burundi is a genocide in process.
No analysis of justice and reconciliation in Rwanda can remain
oblivious to its wider impact on the Great Lakes region of Africa.
There is an inextricable relationship between the political and inter-
ethnic situation in Rwanda and that in Burundi, which impacts upon
neighboring countries and their regional geopolitical struggles.  As a
leading commentator observed, the assassination in October 1993 of
the Hutu President Ndadaye by Tutsi extremists at the beginning of
the democratic transition process in Burundi “adversely affected the
peace process in Rwanda and dealt a fatal blow to the Arusha ac-
cord”81 whereas conversely “the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda con-
firmed the worst fears of many Burundian Tutsi and strengthened
them in their conviction that the control of the army was vital for
their survival.”82  On the other hand, the “victory of the Tutsi-
dominated RPF in Rwanda and the successful challenge to democ-
racy by extremist Tutsi in Burundi is profoundly frustrating Hutu of
both countries.”83  Similarly, the Secretary-General characterized the
deleterious consequences for Burundi of the mass violence in
Rwanda as follows:
Much of the Tutsi minority, historically dominant, lives with the
phobia of its physical elimination, while the Hutu majority demands
proper political representation.  The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has
heightened the fears of the minority, leading extremist elements to
undertake ruthless actions against Hutu populations.  Hutu ex-
tremists, in turn, are reinforced and supported from outside the
country by some of the perpetrators of the Rwandese genocide.  In
such an environment, the voices of moderation are being drowned
out, silenced or eliminated altogether.84
80. Id. at 9.
81. FILIP REYNTJENS, BURUNDI: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE 20 (1995).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Burundi, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess.,
para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/1996/116 (1996).
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The human rights situation in Burundi is one of exceptional
gravity.  It would be no exaggeration to say that it represents a geno-
cide in the making, or rather, a “double genocide,” with the Hutu and
Tutsi acting alternately as victim and perpetrator.  According to the
July 1994 report of an International Commission of Inquiry, com-
prising representatives of several human rights non-governmental or-
ganizations, an estimated 50,000 people were killed as a result of the
political violence following the assassination of President Ndadaye in
1993.85  In 1996, the number of deaths is estimated at up to 100,000
and the killings continue unabated.86  According to the outspoken
former American Ambassador to Burundi, Robert Krueger, “a rea-
sonable estimate is that 100 people are killed daily in Burundi.”87  He
draws a comparison with the notorious Oklahoma City bombing,
pointing out that Burundi, as a small African nation, is suffering an
equivalent death toll each day.88  With the Rwandan tragedy in retro-
spect, will the world be spectator to yet another monstrous genocide
in Africa?
Burundi is a test case for preventive action against genocide.  In
an unprecedented report to the Security Council, the Secretary-
General put forward the stark reality of Burundi and the options of
the international community.  In clear terms, and relying variously on
humanitarian concerns, security threats and cost-effectiveness, he as-
serted:
The objective of the international community must be to prevent
the escalation of present tensions in Burundi into full-scale civil
war, ethnic violence and genocide.  The risk of such developments
in Burundi has been demonstrated by the events of October 1993
and earlier outbreaks of violence.  Apart from the casualties and
the human suffering another such catastrophe would entail, it
would almost certainly lead to massive flows of refugees into
neighbouring countries.  This in turn would lead to further regional
85. See Rapport de la Commission Internationale d’Enquête sur les Violations des Droits de
l’Homme au Burundi Depuis le 21 Octobre 1993, Rapport Final, July 1994, at p. 176.  The hu-
man rights NGOs were, respectively: Human Rights Watch, Fédération Internationale des
Droits de l’Homme, Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs, Organi-
sation Mondiale Contre la Torture, Centre National pour la Coopération au Développement,
Nationaal Centrum voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, and NOVIB.
86. See Burundi After the Coup, THE ECONOMIST, August 3, 1996, at 35.
87. Chris McGreal, For Rwanda, Read Burundi, THE OBSERVER REVIEW, July 7, 1996 at
3.
88. See id.
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destabilization, as well as the expenditure of billions of dollars on
humanitarian relief services over an extended period.  The costs of
preventive action must be examined in this context.89
The report explained that although “preventive diplomacy should
remain the preferred mode of conflict management and resolution,”
when the parties to a dispute are not prepared to engage in a con-
structive dialogue and the situation threatens to escalate into ethnic
violence and genocide, it then becomes necessary to consider “other
steps of a preventive nature, including those with a military aspect, to
persuade the parties to leave the path of confrontation.”90  The Secre-
tary-General expressed the view that “the situation in Burundi has
reached this stage” and that “less than two years after the genocide in
Rwanda, the international community must not again be caught un-
prepared.”91  Accordingly, he recommended the establishment of a
“standby multinational military force” with the mandate—should it
become necessary to undertake a humanitarian intervention in Bu-
rundi—”to deter massacres, to provide security to refugees, displaced
persons and civilians at risk and to protect key economic installa-
tions.”92
The Secretary-General referred to Burundi as a “test case” for
the United Nations ability to take preventive action, noting that it
could even contribute “to the continuing search for a workable sys-
tem of collective security at a time when civil wars and ethnic con-
flicts are becoming increasingly frequent.”93  He spoke of the
“warning signs” in Burundi and concluded that “if another tragedy
befalls the Burundian people and the international community again
proves to be unprepared, despite all the warnings, it will cause untold
human suffering and gravely damage the credibility of the United
Nations.”94
It is submitted that an effective preventive strategy must also in-
clude the credible threat of judicial intervention or individual crimi-
nal liability for serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Extremist leaders must be warned in unequivocal terms that they
cannot protect themselves behind the shield of the state, with or
89. U.N. Doc. S/1996/116 (1996), supra note 84, para. 22.
90. Id. para. 23.
91. Id. para. 24.
92. Id. para. 28.
93. Id. para. 44.
94. Id. para. 45.
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without military intervention.  The arrest and prosecution of former
Rwandan leaders before the International Tribunal should send a
message to the potential or existing perpetrators of genocide in Bu-
rundi that they will be held individually accountable for their crimes,
irrespective of their official position.  It should become clear to all
that the international community will diligently and uncompromis-
ingly pursue such genocidal killers.  But the threat must be as direct
as possible.  While the immediate establishment of yet another ad
hoc international jurisdiction for Burundi may be too burdensome for
a Security Council experiencing atrocity fatigue, the international
community should already put into place a mechanism for the sys-
tematic collection of evidence, both as a deterrence and a means of
expediting prosecutions at a later stage as circumstances require.
One possible option would be for the Security Council to establish a
Commission of Experts which, with relative organizational efficiency
and cost-effectiveness, could prepare the stage for prosecutions once
the moment is opportune.
The prosecution of genocidal crimes in Burundi, however,
should not be conditional on any particular political outcome, al-
though it may be necessary to await a propitious political climate.  If
extremist leaders—whether Tutsi or Hutu—who have already com-
mitted mass killings are allowed to enjoy impunity, it will be ex-
tremely difficult to allow the voices of moderation and reconciliation
to prevail on the political stage.  In 1972, Tutsi extremists massacred
an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu in Burundi, resulting addition-
ally in the mass exodus of 300,000 refugees to neighboring countries.95
Needless to say, this was an immense crime, but it was also one which
“heralded a culture of impunity”96 in Burundi: “The fact that no one
was prosecuted has convinced those responsible for massive human
rights violations that anything is possible, without fear of prosecution
by either the domestic judicial system or the international commu-
nity.”97  As in Rwanda, therefore, lasting reconciliation is not possible
in Burundi if a culture of impunity is allowed to continue.
95. See Kathleen Teltsch, Killings Go On in Burundi, U.N. Statement Suggests, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 1972, at 1.
96. REYNTJENS, supra note 81, at 7.
97. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION: FERTILE GROUND FOR JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION IN THE HUMAN CONSCIENCE
The establishment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals by the
Security Council is the result of public outcry as well as the favorable
confluence of political circumstances.  It is upon the blood and misery
of countless victims that the beginnings of a long-awaited interna-
tional penal court can be discerned.  The interdependence of justice
and reconciliation in the wake of mass violence, the convergence of
peace-building and respect for human rights, provides an auspicious
opportunity for the world community to move towards a future free
from the odious scourge of genocide.
While much has been said about the pragmatic dimension of
punishing mass human rights violations as a preventive measure or as
a means of post-conflict peace-building, relatively little has been said
about the psychological and spiritual dimensions of justice and rec-
onciliation.  Evidently, ethnic hatred and violence is an ancient and
intractable problem, and an infinitely complex phenomenon.  None-
theless, it is possible to posit the simple thesis that adverse distinc-
tions exist first and foremost in our minds.  The renowned African
scholar, Ali A. Mazrui, noted that “violations of human rights are
preceded by a process of psychic subhumanization” by which the
violator “subhumanizes his victim in his own imagination,” although
“residual humanity is often necessary to give meaning to the sin of
inter-human cruelty.”98  Such dehumanization, he explained, is the
“reverse of the psychology of love” because no human being can love
a non-human object “unless the object undergoes psychic humaniza-
tion in the imagination of the lover.”99  When someone loves her dog
“it is because the dog has been, in some sense, anthropomorphized,”
and when someone loves his “motherland” it is because his imagina-
tion “has invoked a metaphor of human kinship” with the territory.100
The psychology of hate, on the other hand, requires “a partial reduc-
tion of humanity.”101  Since it is difficult to hate an inanimate object
or animal, the most fertile soil for hatred is that “intermediate area of
sub-humanity” or “tendency on the part of the hater to reduce the
humanity of the person hated.”102
98. Ali A. Mazrui, Human Rights and the Moving Frontier of World Culture, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 243, 243 (1986).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Dehumanization always begins in our imagination and some-
times ends in the sort of cataclysm which the world witnessed in
Rwanda during 1994.  Before ordinary Hutu could participate in the
slaughter of defenseless children, the Tutsi had to be portrayed as an
inherently bloodthirsty and cruel people; they had to be denigrated as
belonging to an alien Hamitic race that had invaded Rwanda from
Ethiopia,103 and therefore needed to be eliminated.  In essence, this
process of dehumanization is often a contrivance of populist leaders
which feeds on the primitive impulse to denigrate others as a means
of self-affirmation.  It is telling to recall here the words of the leader
of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, who argued before the U.S.
Senate prior to the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War that African slav-
ery is a means of achieving brotherhood: “One of the reconciliating
[sic] features of the existence of Negro slavery is the fact that it raises
white men to the same general level, that it dignifies and exhorts
every white man by the presence of a lower race.”104
In contrast to such racist mythology, justice in its deepest sense is
an affirmation of the truth of human equality, a basic attribute of our
social being without which lasting peace cannot be attained.  It is an
affirmation of the truth that the greatest struggle of all is not a war
between peoples, but rather, a war between humanity and its nega-
tion.  But justice and reconciliation cannot be relegated as the pre-
serve of the victim and perpetrator alone, because our shared hu-
manity dictates that those who were mere spectators in the face of
inhumanity are also part of the equation.  That genocide is a crime
against humanity is not simply a pious juridical declaration; it is also
an expression of the inescapable fact that in an interdependent world
community, such immense suffering affects us all.  It is an affirmation
of the oneness and wholeness of the human race.
103. See Rapport Final, supra note 19, at 24-25.
104. Jefferson Davis, quoted in Study on the Achievements Made and Obstacles Encoun-
tered During the Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination: Report by Mr. A. Eide,
Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 41st Sess., Prov. Agenda
Item 5(a), para. 274, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/8 (1989).
